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of products) and base the price in their own 
country on those observations. For example, 
Slovakia takes the second lowest price in the 
EU and makes price revisions twice a year. 
The tradeoffs between the two pricing sche-
mes is clear: evidence-based pricing requires 
exploring the value of a drug while in some 
way attempting to establish a price based on 
a society’s willingness-to-pay for the drug, 
and reference pricing is a system that tends 
to drive prices to a common minimum – the 
logic often being that such a determination 
is a fair value as companies are selling at 
these prices in other countries. This provides 
an opportunity for the countries to bypass 
socio-economic development factors alto-
gether; research suggests that drug prices do 
not vary based on the macroeconomic deve-
lopment factors of each market, which sug-
gests reference pricing is the more common 
system [1]. 
International reference pricing mechani-
sms have largely stayed within the realm of 
list prices and as a result, list prices tend to 
show a downward trend in these countries 
over time. The discounts and rebates offe-
red at national, regional, or local levels by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have largely 
stayed “invisible” and therefore, did not en-
ter into reference calculations. However, re-
cent trends are making some of these off-list 
prices more transparent. Germany has been 
able to implement a system where a manda-
tory rebate will be enforced in a way that it is 
there for everyone to see. Such off-list price 
arrangements are, however, becoming incre-
asingly difficult to maintain as countries and 
HTA agencies are requiring more rigorous 
reporting on how net prices are determined. 
More and more countries are expected to go 
beyond list prices and begin to look at net pri-
ces as a better proxy of the real prices in their 
referenced markets. Considering these tren-
ds, it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
manufacturers to maintain differential prices 
across countries. The evolving nature of re-
How countries pay for patented pharmaceu-
ticals varies widely in terms of complexity 
of rules and processes. A pharmaceutical 
pricing scheme should ideally provide af-
fordable drug access to those in need while 
allowing the manufacturers to receive enou-
gh profits to sustain continued technological 
innovation. Profit-seeking pharmaceutical 
companies are incentivized to set prices in 
a way that would maximize their revenues 
and sustain long term dominance of specific 
market segments and they understandably 
attempt to justify these practices as a neces-
sity to cover their R&D investments. Health 
authorities, on the other hand, typically have 
a current budget constraint under which they 
have to work and have some incentive to di-
scount the value of future innovation. While 
some countries have allowed “free pricing”, 
others have introduced concepts such as 
“value-based pricing” or enforced rigid price 
controls. As one looks across various country 
markets, there is a range of practices that fall 
somewhere along this continuum.
For the current discussion, our focus is on the 
practice of value-based pricing – focusing 
on the diversity between evidence-based pri-
cing and reference pricing approaches. We 
are, in particular, seeing emerging new pres-
sures that are beginning to have an impact 
on some of these long-standing practices. 
For all practical purposes, we might remove 
the so-called “free pricing” countries from 
this thought exercise as this as a concept is a 
dying breed outside of the US. Similarly, we 
have not attempted to consider countries that 
are under some form of price control. In evi-
dence-based pricing, countries may establish 
health technology assessment (HTA) organi-
zations in hopes of creating a systematic and 
transparent framework for evaluating the 
prices of drugs in terms of their outcomes. 
At the other end of the spectrum, reference 
pricing countries scan prices in other health 
systems (and in cases where a domestic refe-
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ference pricing combined with other issues 
such as transparency to net prices is likely to 
eventually push prices down towards margi-
nal costs, which will reduce profits available 
to the manufacturers.
It is not surprising that manufacturers are now 
exploring concepts of differential pricing as 
an alternative to the current regime that are 
driven largely by reference pricing mechani-
sms. The differential pricing scheme could be 
viewed as a way to maintain the flexibility 
of evidence-based pricing but adjusted to re-
flect local realities [2]. In differential pricing, 
countries (or individuals) pay an amount 
according to their willingness to pay, which 
may differ based on factors such as income 
and wealth. To provide an analogy, movie ti-
ckets are an example of differential pricing 
in everyday life: children and seniors receive 
discounts because their fixed incomes typi-
cally result in a lower ability and willingness 
to pay. The theoretical foundations of diffe-
rential pricing can be found in Ramsey pri-
cing concepts applied to a segmented global 
market place and suggests higher profits for 
monopolistic producers who can price discri-
minate [3]. 
The differential pricing idea is, however, 
beset with a number of technical and prac-
tical difficulties. Even though the scheme fa-
cilitates creation of a relative score that can 
be used to adjust prices to local conditions, 
there should still be a consensus “benchmark 
price,” which could prove to be problematic. 
Will countries be willing to set aside natio-
nal autonomy on setting prices and agree on 
a benchmark country? Countries under re-
ference pricing schemes may see prices for 
drugs increase when shifting to a differential 
pricing system. As an example, if the diffe-
rential price matrix is tied to GDP per capita, 
some countries such as Luxembourg may end 
up with higher prices than their neighbors. 
Currently, Luxembourg references prices 
from Belgium, France, and Germany, but if 
the differential price rules are correlated with 
GDP per capita, Luxembourg could pay over 
double its neighbors [4].
Going beyond the technical issues, it is un-
clear as to how such a pricing scheme can be 
applied to a country keeping in mind income 
distribution and regional disparities. First, 
how is the willingness-to-pay or marginal be-
nefit determined for each country? The com-
mon answer is that prices could be a multiple 
of the relative GDP per capita between the 
country in question and the benchmarked 
country. Such a rule would assume that the 
sole determinant of willingness to pay is the 
income level of an individual without any 
regard to fairness. To account for fairness 
or equality, perhaps the rule would need to 
include some measure of income dispersion, 
such as the Gini coefficient. While using 
GDP per capita as the rule may be implemen-
table, there is no clear means of incorporating 
dispersion measures into differential pricing 
rules, and the profit-maximizing rule from 
the producer might not necessarily be aligned 
with the optimal fairness rule. Other factors 
in determining willingness to pay could in-
clude the burden of disease for the indica-
tion of the drug or even conspicuous con-
sumption, where individuals want to spend 
money to publically display economic power, 
i.e., conspicuous consumption [5]. The the-
ory underlying differential pricing does not 
answer how these factors might be relevant 
in the case of patented medicines.
A sine qua non for an effective differential 
pricing scheme for patented medicines is the 
absence of cross border sales. In fact, dif-
ferential pricing, by its very nature, opens 
up arbitrage opportunities. For example, if 
children could resell discounted movie ti-
ckets to adults, theaters may abandon the di-
scounted tickets program, which will prevent 
the children with lower willingness to pay th-
resholds from enjoying the movie. Free trade 
and free movement of goods across borders 
are sanctioned by law in many parts of the 
world and therefore, are key features that any 
differential pricing scheme will have to ac-
count for.
Most health economists would probably 
agree that reference pricing of patented me-
dicines would be not efficient in the long-run, 
largely because it is likely to end up stifling 
innovation. The practical difficulties of a dif-
ferential pricing regime replacing current mo-
del make it nothing more than an academic 
concept at this time. However, at the periphe-
ry, differential pricing and similar approaches 
can provide meaningful relief to marginali-
zed countries such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa, at least in the foreseeable future, as 
has been demonstrated by HIV medicines 
and tiered pricing for vaccines. Although the 
differential pricing theory is appealing, key 
technical and policy challenges remain, and 
the path towards full-scale implementation 
appears murky at best.
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